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Abstract—Approaches to the provision of data analytics for
businesses offer methods to analyse and model data, enabling
informed decision making to improve business performance and
profitability. Typically, analytics processing is an intensive task
and the demand for business insight, on-demand, means that
organisations make use of elastic cloud provisioned resources
to host such services. However, within the shared domains of
multi-tenant cloud computing, business data and models are
exposed to greater security threats and compromised privacy,
since an unauthorised user may be able to gain access to
highly sensitive, consolidated business-critical information. Busi-
ness analytics processes are often composed from orchestrated,
collaborating services, which are consumed by users from mul-
tiple cloud systems (in different security realms), which need
to be engaged dynamically at runtime. If heterogeneous cloud
systems located in different security realms do not have direct
authentication relationships, then it is a considerable technical
challenge to enable secure collaboration. In order to address
this security challenge, a new authentication framework is
required to establish trust amongst business analytics service
instances and users by distributing a common session secret to all
participants of a session. We address this challenge by designing
and implementing a secure multiparty authentication framework
for dynamic interaction, for the scenario where members of
different security realms express a need to access orchestrated
services. This novel framework exploits the relationship of trust
between session members in different security realms, to enable
a user to obtain security credentials that access cloud resources
in a remote realm. The mechanism assists cloud session users
to authenticate their session membership, thereby improving
the performance of authentication processes within multiparty
sessions. We see applicability of this framework beyond multiple
cloud infrastructure, to that of any scenario where multiple
security realms has the potential to exist, such as the emerging
Internet of Things (IoT).
Keywords— Cloud computing, analytics, security, multiparty in-
teractions, Internet of Things
I. INTRODUCTION
It is common for modern organisations to utilise and benefit
from the adoption of cloud and internet based computing. Users
of cloud computing infrastructure can concentrate on the delivery
of high value/profit services at high levels of Quality of Service
(QoS), without being pre-occupied with large-scale investments in
hardware and specialist skills for the support and maintenance of
such systems [1], [2]. In particular the regular upgrades and expense
of licenses of application software used to run business processes,
related transactions and decision-support systems [3] are a significant
demand upon an organisation’s resources.
Cloud-based systems are a fundamental enabling technology in
this regard, that provide utility and ease with regard to universal
availability and timely access. However, cloud computing has its own
constraints and security considerations that need to be taken into
account with regard to its effective deployment [4].
Security is of paramount importance to a business organisation
that consumes and generates data, and the awareness of the risks
associated with data breaches means that ignorance of the approaches
to managing cloud security is a significant inhibiting factor in the
adoption of cloud environments [5], [6].
With the growing popularity of services delivered by cloud com-
puting, it is important that both cloud providers and cloud users have
the appropriate safeguards in place to ensure satisfactory security
and protection of privacy [7], [8]. A number of researchers have
contributed to strengthen security and privacy protection in cloud ap-
plications, and there are various cryptographic algorithms to address
potential security and privacy problems in cloud [9], [10], [13], [14].
It follows that research topics related to cloud security have attracted
tremendous research interest [11], [12], [15], [16].
A. Business Intelligence and data analytics
Business Intelligence (BI) and latterly data analytics, have been
identified as major commercial and technological developments that
cloud computing can host and enhance. Both of these technologies
provide ways of analysing data in a meaningful manner so as to
facilitate decision making, and are aimed at increasing productivity
and enhancing business performance [17]. Increased connectivity
between information systems across the world have grown globally
integrated databases with higher complexities than the traditional
organisational repositories.These databases are often spread across
cloud computing infrastructure, giving rise to new opportunities in
web services-based business intelligence, OLAP using XML data
files [18]–[20], and predictive analytics as multidimensional data
organisations emerge along with advances in technology at lower
cost.
Online analytical processing (OLAP) is the user-end interface of
BI that is designed to present multi-dimensional graphical reports to
the end users. OLAP employs a technique called multidimensional
analysis and is mainly used to enable flexible interactive analysis of
multidimensional data [21]. Predictive analytics extends data analyt-
ics to incorporate modelling and learning capabilities to facilitate
the forecasting of all aspects of an organisation and its business
environment.
A BI, OLAP and data/predictive analytics framework is expected
to provide timely, accurate, organised and integrated information to
business decision makers [22].
Cloud BI is the concept of delivering BI and data analytics
capabilities as a service. With cloud BI solutions, business users will
be able to keep a better fiscal control over IT projects and have the
flexibility to elastically scale up or down usage as needs change [17].
B. Heterogeneous service delivery and security
Currently, distributed data analytics applications in business are
encompassing an increasing level of computation and a similarly
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increasing level of enthusiasm as the benefits of predictive modelling
are realised. Generally, a business procedure should be flexible in
both application and method to enable dynamic business response.
An effect of this is that the execution sequence of a given process
may not be predictable for all circumstances, even to the extent that
sometimes, the real process of execution can be a “one-of-a-kind”
[23].
Thus, the services and applications employed in a procedure are
characteristically heterogeneous and might be offered and maintained
by various, traditionally unrelated organisations.
Companies have their own homogenous security mechanisms and
policies to protect their local resources against security threats but
applications residing on the resources of different organisations
operate in correspondingly numerous different heterogeneous security
realms.
A security realm may be viewed as a group of principals (like peo-
ple, services, and computers) registered with a certain authentication
authority (a trusted principal), and controlled through a consistent
set of security processes and policies to marshall access to services
and resources [24]. An authentication authority is a principal that
is considered universally trusted and can be relied upon to execute
trustworthy authentication functions [25].
As shown by this explanation, authentication is vital for each
security realm and before a principal can have a right to use the
resources controlled by a security realm, verification of its identity
must be confirmed by the authentication procedure of the security
realm in order to ascertain the principal who it purports to be.
To identify a principal during the process of authentication, the
principal has to announce credentials that were provided to it by the
authentication authority of the security realm.
Cloud-based business processes contain collaborating BI/data an-
alytics services from multiple heterogeneous security realms which
need to be executed and engaged dynamically at runtime. If authen-
tication relationships are established among different security realms,
the process may involve large numbers of extra and computationally
expensive steps for converting artefacts.
Hada et al [26] demonstrate the need for a multiparty session
authentication protocol, if a multiparty session is constructed out of
multiple two-party sessions. It is difficult in some cases for a session
user to determine and verify whether the service instance the user
contacts is a member of the same multiparty session.
C. Cross-realm authentication
In a cross-realm authentication scenario, the techniques used in
a two-party session do not address such heterogeneous cross-realm
authentication issues, which require both credential conversion and
the establishment of authentication paths.
Federated authentication establishments may require time consum-
ing activities for negotiations and amendments. This situation may
become further complicated when multiple parties coordinate within
an authentication system to access resources hosted on multiple
clouds.
Existing frameworks do not address the scenario where members
of multiple sub-domains want to interact to access resources stored
on multiple clouds. This is also a significant issue for any system
where it is envisaged that multiparty authentication is required.
The continued increase in the proliferation of small, discrete
compute and storage devices means that cross-realm authentication
is required beyond the use case of multi-tenant, multi-cloud infras-
tructures.
The Internet of Things is one domain where it is foreseen that
the ability to orchestrate trusted services from myriad connected
devices is essential. Further evidence of such thinking is the research
community’s interest in microservice architectures, where container-
isation is utilised to assist the design of software architectures that
can scale rapidly [27], which is a fundamental design requirement of
IoT applications [28].
D. Contribution and article organisation
In this paper, we propose a novel multiparty authentication frame-
work for securing business data analytics within cloud computing
infrastructure. More specifically, our proposal applies to the situation
where members of different security realms need to access distributed
analytics services through a trusted principal.
Our proposed framework can authenticate dynamically, minimising
the requirement for additional credential conversion processes that
will initiate extensive invocations to intermediate services.
The main contribution has been to propose a system and procedure
which simplifies the authentication process that is undertaken, be-
tween two unrelated secure business environments, prior to allowing
data interchange.
This simplification significantly improves the speed of authentica-
tion, thereby reducing overall transaction time, and most notably is
achieved without compromising the security of either party.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 reviews the
existing solutions of the multiparty authentication. This is intended
to identify research gaps in this domain. Section 3 describes the
design of the multiparty authentication system for BI, the mechanisms
for hosting it on cloud computing. Section 4 presents the results of
simulations, and critical analysis of results. Section 5 provides the
conclusion of the paper and outlines future work.
II. MULTIPARTY AUTHENTICATION
Cloud computing offers shared applications and software platforms
and infrastructure services on multi-tenant information technology
systems built upon virtualised infrastructure. The such cloud solutions
optimising resource sharing while providing isolation solutions at
different levels required by the tenant [31].
However, in the shared domains of cloud computing, BI and data
analytics services are exposed to security and privacy threats by
virtue of exploits, eavesdropping, distributed attacks, malware attacks,
and other known challenges to cloud computing [17] and distributed
systems in general.
A. Dynamic authentication
In a multi-tenancy environment, authentication frameworks cannot
be static. Business processes and systems running on clouds are
dynamic and hence the authentication interactions need to be able
to support dynamic behaviour as well.
Burrows et al [29] proposed a global authentication register
comprising a privacy framework for tenants. The register holds a
private key and personalised data of each tenant for certification
of a registration request. The system issues a private key after the
personalised data has been provided to the registrar and matched
successfully.
In cloud computing, a global authentication register may be viewed
as a multi-tenant database holding primary records about registered
tenants and additional extended tables for recording unique detail
about each tenant [30].
The primary table comprises details generated by the cloud service
provider created for each tenant as per a standard format. Extended
tables may record unique details provided by the tenants against a list
of metadata classes (for example, names of spouse, dog, first school,
mother, favourite movie star, favourite colour, etc.).
The extension tables assist in validating private details about a
tenant before issuing a private key for accessing the user’s workspace.
This concept is referred to as “identity-based cryptography” [32].
The root key is the public key for unlocking a cloud or grid-based
workspace.
Root keys are appended with the private key based on an identity-
based signature generated by an interaction process, that comprises
identity information entered by the client and the corresponding
digital signature generated by the server. The signature is used by
the authentication registry server to append private key fields in the
root key and issue to the requesting client.
In cloud computing, identity-based cryptography and identity-
based signature generation may be performed by a separate array
of servers (cloud array) dedicated for privacy-as-a-service [32]. The
clouds may comprise hierarchical key structure as shown in Figure
1.
Fig. 1. Hierarchical key structures in cloud computing.
The key has two parts: a public key field and one part as a private
key field [30].
The first public key part is common for all valid cloud tenants
whereas the second public key part is common for all tenants
of a sub-domain within the main cloud. The private key part is
for individual tenants that are determined as per individual digital
signatures, which are generated by a separate array of servers against
private information provided by the tenants.
B. Cloud sub-domains
A cloud sub-domain is a group of multiple private virtual
workspaces owned by an organisation or a group of related tenants
(for example, a community or society). A common public key for
the sub-domain ensures that only the tenants owning workspaces are
allowed to access them [33].
For example, employees of an organisation will obtain access to
the sub-domain public key by virtue of their employment records
in the organisation. On top of the sub-domain public key, a tenant-
specific private key will be assigned and appended based on private
information provided by individual tenants.
Figure2 shows how this hierarchical scheme can ensure authenti-
cation of employees for uploading or downloading business data to
and from the cloud respectively. Private keys for employees may be
hosted locally by the company that appends the private key portion
with the sub-domain key generated by the cloud for the company.
These two keys are finally appended to the root key of the cloud.
C. Cross-cloud federation
This framework may become complicated further when multiple
parties coordinate within an authentication system for accessing
resources stored on multiple clouds through the home cloud. In
this scenario, a cross-cloud federation system may be established
comprising discovery agents, match-making agents and authentication
agents [34].
The discovery agent manages a process for discovering the re-
sources requested by the parties by browsing the available foreign
clouds. A match-making agent manages a process for short-listing
foreign clouds to gain access to the resources requested. The authen-
tication agent creates a security context and trust relationship between
the parties and the home cloud, and between the home cloud and the
foreign clouds, as shown in Figure 2.
There are multiple steps involved in this framework as follows:
Fig. 2. Hierarchical multi-party structure in Multi-cloud computing
1) All parties make authentication requests.
2) Authentication agent sends queries for artefacts to all parties.
3) Artefact requests are resolved and a group-level public key is
generated for all parties.
4) Discovery agent locates resources amongst available foreign
clouds.
5) Match-making agent shortlists the preferred foreign clouds.
6) Home cloud requests public keys from the foreign clouds.
7) Foreign clouds make a request for artefacts before sending
the keys, which the home cloud provides (establishing trust
relationships between the home cloud and the foreign clouds).
On receipt of the keys, multiple keys are generated integrating the
home cloud public key and the corresponding foreign cloud keys for
trusted access to the resources.
The resources are collected by the home cloud and made accessible
to the authentication server for the entire multi-party group. The
individuals in the party gain access to the resources through the
authentication server by providing individual secrets and gain private
keys. The private keys are appended with the group key that in turn
is appended with the home cloud key.
As an alternative to the previous two steps, the home cloud can
forward the group’s artefacts to the foreign clouds such that they can
provide individual public keys to the group’s authentication server.
These group public keys (assigned by different foreign clouds) can
be appended with the individual private keys such that they can be
given access to the resources on an individual basis, being a member
of this multi-party group.
Such a group authentication protocol requires the sharing of a
number of security attributes, like secrets for group session keys,
secrets for private keys, secrets for key duplication (for resilience),
secrets for session forwarding to other clouds, and secrets for control
of key distribution (opening a vault of keys) [34]. To facilitate
automated inter-organisational processes, trust, dependability and
security needs have to be ascertained [35].
Dependability and security are interrelated through a number
of attributes (confidentiality, integrity, availability, reliability, main-
tainability, and safety). There can be faults and errors in inter-
organisational authentication processes leading to failure of services
[35]. There are higher chances of faults and errors in modern
distributed business environments in which the business specifications
are dynamic and the runtime executing them can sometimes be
unpredictable. It is very difficult to standardise the runtimes as there
may be “one-of-a-kind”, bespoke execution of processes [24].
Fig. 3. Proposed multiparty session authentication framework in cloud
environments.
III. A SYSTEM FOR MULTIPARTY AUTHENTICATION
In this section, the proposed framework for dynamic authentication
interactions in a distributed environment is shown in Figure 3. We
propose the addition of a session authority cloud with the purpose of
controlling sessions of multiple clouds.
There shall be no concept of home or foreign clouds. Every cloud
obeys the decisions made by the session authority cloud. The session
authority cloud shall hold a large array of servers acting as a security
vault.
This vault holds authentication credentials and digital signatures
of the tenants of all clouds. The root keys of all the clouds are stored
in the vault having folders identifying the clouds. An active tenant
will “know the root key of its own cloud.
The heterogeneous security realms (sub-domains) are distributed
among all of the clouds and are identified through separate sub-
domain keys. These keys are stored in subfolders within the corre-
sponding cloud folders. The concept of private key assignment against
a digital signature will be adopted, but only for entry into the relevant
sub-domain of the cloud.
In the multiparty session scenario, members of multiple sub-
domains may interact within a session. All such sessions will be
identified by the session authority cloud. The session keys will
comprise of a root key of the cloud, sub-domain key, and the portion
identifying the session.
This means that there will be multiple session keys valid for a
session, each having a common field for the session, but varied fields
for cloud root keys and sub-domain keys.
There is no need for any negotiation among the clouds because
the session authority cloud “knows all of the clouds and their sub-
domains. The schematic of the proposed framework is shown in
Figure3. The fundamental principles of the proposed model are:
(a) Each session participant should be a tenant of at least one cloud
in the multi-cloud framework controlled by the session authority
cloud.
(b) If a potential participant is not a cloud member, the introducing
participant will have to share credentials with it for joining its
own cloud.
(c) Each session will have multiple valid keys. While the session
key field will be common (refreshed on change of number
of participants), the cloud root keys and sub-domain (security
realm) keys will vary depending upon the membership profiles
of the participants.
A. A model for secure multiparty authentication
In this section, we present a multiparty authentication system
model for securing BI and data analytics services on the cloud.
The proposed system specifically addresses scenarios where business
applications that reside on the clouds, that are composed of members
of different security realms, want to access distributed data analytics
services through a trusted principal. These scenarios are applicable
when there are no direct authentication relationships between the
stakeholders of different security realms and the distributed data
analytics services in multiple cloud systems.
B. Modelling environment and simulation design
The entire multi-cloud model was created with OPNET modeller,
using HP9000 Superdome 64 CPU mega modular servers. These
servers are the most powerful systems available in OPNET’s model
library in the academic edition. Each server can host hundreds of
virtual machines. The model is shown in Figure 4 and is described
as follows:
• The object A in this model comprises an Internet cloud of
1000 users, each representing a trusted principal by the SAC
requesting a session each for a foreign user (member of a
different security realm) on their behalf.
• The objects F, SAC, SAC −DB, and SAC − SH are inde-
pendent HP9000 Superdome servers, whereas clouds A and B
are collections of four HP9000 Superdome servers each.
• SW1 is an Internet switch connecting the trusted principals to
the entire inter-cloud framework.
• SW2 is an internal switch of the inter-cloud framework inter-
connecting the clouds A and B with the core cloud certification
authority (SAC in this model) and all its supporting services
(F, SAC −DB, and SAC − SH).
• SW1 and SW2 are advanced Cisco chassis-based switches.
The red lines represent 1000 BaseX links and the numbers at the
centre of each line represent the number of links per connection.
For example, the red line connecting A with F has eight 1000 BaseX
links. This represents a powerful network within OPNET modeller,
with little scope for link and node level congestions for 1000 users
connecting the network. It follows that any delays discovered in the
simulation results are because of the execution times of the phases
of the authentication algorithm.
C. Phase modelling
The OPNET tasks object has been used to define the phases of
the authentication algorithm. Tables I and II illustrate how they have
been modelled within OPNET modeller. Table I illustrates the phases
configured without any phase-wise timeouts.
Table II illustrates a timeout of 60 seconds per phase. Both of the
configurations were simulated separately in OPNET modeller. The
phases are sequential and each is considered as a request or a response
between the stated nodes. In each phase, an appropriate amount of
data is transferred as may be needed during practical operation of the
phase.
For example, the first phase A > F and the second phase
F > A are requesting phases in which the data transmission size
is configured as 1024 bytes. However, the third phase A > F is a
responding phase (A submits IDr and IDs to F ) and hence the data
transmission size is 4096 bytes.
The data sizes have been configured accordingly in all phases of
the algorithm. A subsequent phase does not begin unless the previous
phase has ended. Thus, if a phase fails to complete, the subsequent
phase will not begin at all.
Fig. 4. Multi-party authentication model in OPNET.
TABLE I
ALGORITHM STEPS CONFIGURED AS INDIVIDUAL PROTOCOL TASKS IN OPNET TASKS CREATOR OBJECT WITH NO TIMEOUT.
Phase Name Start Phase After Source Destination REQ/RESP Pattern End Phase When Timeout Properties Transport Connection
A>F:Secure (Request, R1, R2) Application Starts A F REQ>RESP> Final Response Used Default
F>A:Secure (Request, IDr, IDs) Previous Phase Ends F A REQ>RESP> Final Response Used Default
A>F:Secure (Response, IDr, IDs) Previous Phase Ends A F REQ>RESP> Final Response Used Default
F>SAC: Fetch (R1, R2): IF Valid (IDr, IDs) Previous Phase Ends F SAC REQ>RESP> Final Response Used Default
F>SAC-DB: Verify (IDr, IDs) Previous Phase Ends SAC SAC-DB REQ>RESP> Final Response Used Default
SAC-DB>SAC: Valid (IDr, IDs) Previous Phase Ends SAC-DB SAC REQ>RESP> Final Response Used Default
SAC>SAC-SH: Invoke (Key, IDess): Fetch (R1, R2) Previous Phase Ends SAC SAC-SH REQ>RESP> Final Response Used Default
SAC:SH>CloudA: Secure (Access, R1) Previous Phase Ends SAC-SH CloudA REQ>RESP> Final Response Used Default
CloudA>SAC : SH : Secure (Access, R1) Previous Phase Ends CloudA SAC-SH REQ>RESP> Final Response Used Default
SAC:SH>CloudB: Secure (Request, R2): IF Key (IDsess) Previous Phase Ends SAC-SH CloudB REQ>RESP> Final Response Used Default
CloudB>SAC: SH: Secure (Access, R2) Previous Phase Ends CloudB SAC-SH REQ>RESP> Final Response Used Default
SAC: SH>F: Secure (Access, R1, R2): Key (IDsess) Previous Phase Ends SAC-SH F REQ>RESP> Final Response Used Default
F>A: Secure (Access, R1, R2): Key (IDsess) Previous Phase Ends F A REQ>RESP> Final Response Used Default
TABLE II
TIMEOUT INTRODUCED IN EACH PHASE OF THE AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL.
Phase Name Start Phase After Source Destination REQ/RESP Pattern End Phase When Timeout Properties Transport Connection
A>F:Secure (Request, R1, R2) Application Starts A F REQ>RESP> Final Response Not Used Default
F>A:Secure (Request, IDr, IDs) Previous Phase Ends F A REQ>RESP> Final Response Not Used Default
A>F:Secure (Response, IDr, IDs) Previous Phase Ends A F REQ>RESP> Final Response Not Used Default
F>SAC: Fetch (R1, R2): IF Valid (IDr, IDs) Previous Phase Ends F SAC REQ>RESP> Final Response Not Used Default
F>SAC-DB: Verify (IDr, IDs) Previous Phase Ends SAC SAC-DB REQ>RESP> Final Response Not Used Default
SAC-DB>SAC: Valid (IDr, IDs) Previous Phase Ends SAC-DB SAC REQ>RESP> Final Response Not Used Default
SAC>SAC-SH: Invoke (Key, IDess): Fetch (R1, R2) Previous Phase Ends SAC SAC-SH REQ>RESP> Final Response Not Used Default
SAC:SH>CloudA: Secure (Access, R1) Previous Phase Ends SAC-SH CloudA REQ>RESP> Final Response Not Used Default
CloudA>SAC : SH : Secure (Access, R1) Previous Phase Ends CloudA SAC-SH REQ>RESP> Final Response Not Used Default
SAC:SH>CloudB: Secure (Request, R2): IF Key (IDsess) Previous Phase Ends SAC-SH CloudB REQ>RESP> Final Response Not Used Default
CloudB>SAC: SH: Secure (Access, R2) Previous Phase Ends CloudB SAC-SH REQ>RESP> Final Response Not Used Default
SAC: SH>F: Secure (Access, R1, R2): Key (IDsess) Previous Phase Ends SAC-SH F REQ>RESP> Final Response Not Used Default
A phase will be deemed as completed only when a final response
has arrived from the requested node to the requesting node. Thus, if
there is congestion on the network and a timeout has been configured
for each phase, the session will be dropped if any of the subsequent
phases fails to execute successfully.
D. Simulation parameters and assumptions
The remaining assumptions for the simulation are as follows:
(a) The phases have been packaged in an application called as
“Protocol Tasks” in the model. Protocol Tasks is a custom
application, which in turn is designed using the tasks object
in OPNET modeller. One needs to enter the attributes in this
field and select the task object packaged with all the phases
configured.
(b) The database application has been configured for running on
SAC −DB only. OPNET’s default high load task format has
been employed. There was no need to configure it manually
because it is not the focus of this research.
(c) The applications are executed using the profiles object, as shown
in the following table. Protocol tasks and SAC−DB have been
configured to execute independently of each other such that they
do not cause a conflict during simulation. Both applications have
been assigned a start offset of 5 to 10 seconds.
However, the start offset of the network itself has been configured
at 100 to 110 seconds. This is because the network is large and should
be given enough time to complete the tasks of the routing protocol. In
this model, the routing protocol selected is RIPv2 (which is OPNET’s
default).
Before explaining the simulations, it is essential to clarify how the
nodes recognise whom to contact to execute a phase. This clarification
is needed to map the symbols (A,F, SAC, SAC − DB, Cloud A,
and Cloud B) with actual servers (names of servers in the network)
on the network. For simplicity, the symbols and server names have
been kept the same in the model.
However, in reality, the cloud environment will be completely
different. This is a complex design in OPNET that needs to be config-
ured carefully by matching the source-destination relationships with
the phases of the customer application (Protocol Tasks authentication
algorithm).
In destination preferences, a node is allowed to communicate with
only those nodes that it is supposed to interact with for executing the
algorithm. Hence, A is allowed to communicate only with F , and F
is allowed to communicate only with A and SAC.
It should also be noted that a recursive relationship (A communi-
cating with A and F communicating with F ) is established in the
destination preferences as well. This ensures that the node is able to
communicate with itself whenever required by OPNET.
Finally, the attachment of a profile to a node is important to provide
instruction about what it needs to execute. This is done by identifying
the profile within the node configuration. In this model, all nodes are
configured to execute the “Protocol Tasks” whereas SAC − DB
is configured to execute “Protocol Tasks” as well as the database
application.
E. Authentication approval protocol
The proposed protocol is specifically addressed to scenarios of
BI and data analytics applications that are accessed via clouds,
where members of different security realms want to access distributed
analytics services through a trusted principal.
These scenarios are applicable when there are no direct authenti-
cation relationships between the people of different security realms
and the distributed BI services in multiple cloud systems.
The session approval protocol begins with a user having member-
ship in any security realm that the trusted principal recognises. It is
assumed to provide access to the BI database objects in clouds A
and B, if the SAC approves the request forwarded by the principal.
It is also assumed that SAC will not entertain any request that is
not forwarded by the principal. The user requesting access is neither
a member of CloudA nor a member of CloudB. In essence, the user
is a member of a security realm that is a different cloud (CloudC),
which is trusted by the SAC (which means that the third cloud is a
member of the SAC −DB). Most importantly, the principal should
recognise who is the user because the SAC trusts the principal for
accepting the session request.
The steps in the algorithm for the authentication protocol are
shown in TableI. IDr is the cloud membership key of the requesting
user. IDs is the sub-domain membership of the requesting user, and
IDsess is the session key assigned by the SAC for accessing the
BI database files residing on clouds A and B.
Clouds A and B will open the access to this key only as it is
approved and forwarded by the SAC (through SAC − SH). R1
and R2 are BI database files residing on clouds A and B that are
requested by the requesting user. A is the trusted principal through
which, the requesting user has approached the SAC.
IV. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS
We observed that the simulation executed 178 million events in the
operation of seven minutes and nine seconds on the network. This is
because it is a reasonably large network with 1000 trusted principals
accessing; a near real-world scenario and hence the results have
practical significance. Figure 5 illustrates the TCP sessions initiated
by the node “A”. Active TCP sessions exceeded 2000 during the
simulation period, indicating that each trusted principal has made
two session requests on average. Hence the authentication protocol
has been triggered more than 2000 times on the network. The overall
Fig. 5. TCP sessions initiated by node “A”
performance and behaviour of authentication protocol tasks on the
network are shown in Figure 6.
The first statistic shows that the overall (end-to-end) response
time of the authentication protocol on the network is about 60
seconds. This is genuine given the time taken in establishing the
TCP connection and transferring the data.
Hence, 60 seconds is a committed performance for executing all
of the 13 phases. However, this is feasible knowing that it is only a
one-time activity for each user being added by the trusted principal.
It is important to note that delays caused by network or host-based
congestions are more serious than protocol execution delays. This has
been verified by confirming the packet network delay measurement
results.
It is observed that the maximum delay occurrence on the network
is less than 0.06 seconds. It was further confirmed by device specific
reports that none of the servers, switches, and links had registered
any packet queues or packet forwarding delays on the network.
Hence, 60 seconds is a committed performance for executing all
of the 13 phases. This delay has occurred because of the amount
Fig. 6. Overall performance metrics and behaviours of the authentication
protocol tasks on the network.
of data exchanged per phase. The metric “application task response
time” is the same as “application phase response time” in this model,
because each phase has only one task in the algorithm. The last two
metrics reflect the overall authentication traffic sent and received on
the network. So, for 1000 trusted principals interacting, the traffic of
up to 1.5 Mbps is quite moderate. This shows that the protocol is
loading the network moderately.
Before drawing any final conclusions, the response times of indi-
vidual phases of the authentication protocol were also investigated.
Figure 7 illustrates this metric for six out of the eleven phases of the
protocol. The overall response time is 5 seconds per phase. This is
genuine given the time taken in establishing the TCP connection and
then transferring the data. The above results pertain to the phases
executed without a timeout. A second simulation was carried out,
including a timeout of 60 seconds per phase. As per the previous
results, the phases should not time out given that each phase was
taking about 5 seconds to execute.However, as shown in Figure 6, the
number of application instances reduced significantly as the phases of
the protocol progressed. This indicates massive session drops because
of timeout configuration.
This result was unexpected because the timeout configured per
phase was larger than the average phase duration observed. Multiple
settings were tested but the results were similar and is a problem
needing further investigation.
In this research, it is recommended that the 13-step authentica-
tion protocol should not have any timeout configured. However, a
localised timeout can be configured at F . If the responses from
the cloud are not received within 200 seconds, the session may be
dropped automatically. This means the full authentication process
Fig. 7. Response times of the individual phases of the authentication protocol.
is from 0-200 seconds. Clouds are like galaxies of servers. For
example, users from multiple companies sitting on multiple clouds
may collaborate on a common research project with the project
manager acting as the trusted principal. The SAC can guarantee
secured access to resources on different clouds. However, it cannot
guarantee performance and committed response times, given that each
member cloud may have its own network configurations. While such
an authentication protocol is essential for multiparty collaborations
on multiple clouds, timeout settings may not be feasible for all the
phases of the authentication protocol.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The cloud computing paradigm is a fundamental, enabling model
for the future development of BI and data analytics services. Cloud
platforms offer several distinct advantages in terms of cost efficiency,
reliability, flexibility and scalability of implementation.
Moreover, the inherent feature of connectivity of cloud architecture
offers the opportunity to take advantage of enhanced data sharing
capabilities. In this article, we have proposed a novel authentication
mechanism model for multi-party authentication of BI mechanisms
for hosting on cloud computing.
This article has considered problems associated with reliable,
timely and secure data transfer mechanisms necessary for shared
business data processing networks. This multiparty authentication
system for dynamic authentication interactions is effective when
members of different security realms want to access distributed
business data services through a trusted principal.
Our proposed mechanism can help cloud session users authenticate
their session membership so as to largely simplify the authentication
processes within multi-party sessions. While this paper has presented
the framework, additional research and development is needed to
develop a set of protocols for multi-party session management and
cross-realm authentication for dynamic authentication interactions
between users and data services in multiple cloud systems located
in different security realms.
The scenario of multiparty authentication across security realms is
not limited to business processes that require access to data services.
Internet of Things (IoT) architectures are a contemporary example of
a need to be able to model, comprehend and deploy authentication
mechanisms that can securely tolerate myriad network nodes that
each provide more cohesive services [28].
We are now progressing the work in two ways. First, we are
formally evaluating the authentication protocols in order to robustly
deploy the framework to an environment that is composed of a mixed
set of discrete devices, enabling the framework to be tolerant of
existing and emerging technologies for cloud platforms and network
infrastructures. Second, we are now including a variety of devices
in addition to clouds within the simulation, to better understand
the effects upon network performance when greater numbers of low
powered compute and storage wireless nodes are introduced. This
replicates the emerging IoT and Industrial IoT scenarios where ex-
tensive integration of Wireless Sensor Networks and edge computing
nodes is commonplace.
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